In [1884], Frege formulated some 'abstraction' principles that imply the existence of abstract objects in classical logic. The most well-known of these is:
Directions:
The direction of line a is identical to the direction of line b iff a is parallel to b. a = b ↔ a b
Shapes:
The shape of figure a is identical to the shape of figure b iff a is (geometrically) similar to b.
With a system that allows for propositions (intensionally conceived) and distinguishes them from truth-values, one could also propose a principle governing truth-values in a way analogous to the above. Of course, Frege wouldn't have formulated such a principle. In his system, sentences denote truth values and the identity symbol can do the job of the biconditional. Thus, in his system, the truth value of p equals the truth value of q just in case p = q. But if we use a modern-day predicate logic instead of a term logic, distinguish propositions from truth values, and allow the propositional variables 'p' and 'q' to range over propositions, something like the following principle governing truth values would be assertible for a modern-day Fregean (Boolos [1986] , 148):
Truth Values:
The truth value of p is identical with the truth value of q iff p is equivalent to q.
Here, and in what follows, the biconditional is not to be construed as an identity sign.
Frege might have called all of these objects 'logical objects', since in [1884] , he thought he had a way of defining them all in terms of a paradigm logical object, namely, extensions. Let us for the moment use α, β as metavariables ranging over variables for objects, concepts, or propositions, ϕ as a metavariable ranging over formulas, andˇ [λα ϕ] for the extension of the (first-or second-level) concept [λα ϕ]. Frege then defined ([1884] , §68) 'the number of F s' (#F ), 'the direction of line a' ( a ), and 'the shape of figure c' (c) as follows:
If we ignore the infamous Section 10 of Frege's Grundgesetze, then the above definitions suggest the following definition of 'the truth value of proposition p' (p • ), given the principle Truth Values:
All of these logical objects would thereby have been systematized by:
Basic Law V:
The extension of the concept [λα ϕ] is identical to the extension of the concept [λα ψ] iff all and only the objects falling under the concept ϕ fall under the concept ψ.
[
λα ϕ] =ˇ[λα ψ] ↔ ∀β([λα ϕ]β ↔ [λα ψ]β)
Since it follows from Basic Law V that for any formula ϕ, ∃x(x =ˇ[λαϕ]) 1 the logical objects defined above (# F , a,c, and p • ) would all be welldefined. Moreover, a Fregean would then suggest that we derive Hume's Principle, Directions, Shapes, and Truth Values from equivalence relations like equinumerosity, parallelism, geometric similarity, and material equivalence. Frege's program was undermined by the inconsistency of Basic Law V with second-order logic. Recently, there has been a renaissance of research on consistent Frege-style systems.
2 In an important series of papers, George Boolos also developed systems for reconstructing Frege's work. We'll focus on the work in Boolos [1986] , [1987] , [1989] , and [1993] . Although in [1986] and [1993] Boolos offers reconstructions of Basic Law V that are consistent with second-order logic, we plan to show that these systems can be made to follow the pattern of his [1987] paper, and that once this pattern is recognized, a comparison becomes possible between the systems Boolos formulated and the 'object theory' formulated in Zalta [1983] , [1988] , [1993] , and [1999] . As we shall see, each of Boolos' systems can be grounded in one non-logical axiom in the form of an explicit 1 Substitute ϕ for ψ in Basic Law V, derive the right condition by logic alone, from which the left condition then follows, and existentially generalize on [λα ϕ].
2 See Schroeder-Heister [1987] , T. Parsons [1987] , Bell [1994] , Heck [1996] , Burgess
[1998], Wehmeier [1999] , Goldfarb [2001] , and Ferreira & Wehmeier [2002] .
David J. Anderson and Edward N. Zalta 4 existence assertion. These explicit existence assertions can be directly compared with the comprehension principle for abstract objects in object theory. This comparison allows one to evaluate the theories of Fregean logical objects formulable in the Boolos and object-theoretic frameworks.
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As part of this evaluation, we shall develop a series of new results in object theory pertaining to logical objects.
Boolos' Systems: Numbers, New V, and New V
In examining Frege's work in the Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik , Boolos arrived at the following insight:
Thus, although a division into two types of entity, concepts and objects, can be found in the Foundations, it is plain that Frege uses not one but two instantiation relations, 'falling under' (relating some objects to some concepts), and 'being in' (relating some concepts to some objects), and that both relations sometimes obtain reciprocally: the number 1 is an object that falls under 'identical with 1', a concept that is in the number 1. (Boolos [1987] , p. 3)
Boolos proceeds to salvage the work in the Foundations by introducing the notion 'G is in the extension x' (Gηx) as the second instantiation relation ('being in') mentioned in the above passage. He then develops what he calls 'Frege Arithmetic' by adding the following assertion to second-order logic:
Numbers:
For every concept F , there is a unique (extension) x which has 'in' it all and only those concepts G which are in one-to-one correspondence with F .
∀F ∃!x∀G(Gηx ↔ G ≈ F )
Boolos then goes on to show that the Dedekind/Peano axioms are derivable from this claim, by first deriving Hume's Principle and then following Frege's plan in the Grundlagen and Grundgesetze. 4 Boolos notes that the explicit assertion of the existence of numbers embodied by Numbers is a way of making clear the commitment implicit in the use of the definite article in 'the number of F s'.
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In his papers of [1986] and [1993] , Boolos returned to the idea of salvaging Frege's work by using biconditionals which are weakenings of Basic Law V. But as we now plan to show, these other developments can be recast in the terms Boolos used for the development of Frege Arithmetic, namely, as explicit existence assertions. To see this, let us rehearse the definitions and principles Boolos provides, first in [1986] and then in [1993] .
In [1986] , Boolos defines the notion of a small concept based on a 'limitation of size' conception of of sets. We may paraphrase his definition 4 Define #F as the object x which has in it all and only those concepts G which are equinumerous with F . Then Hume's Principle is derivable from Numbers. As is now well-known, the Dedekind/Peano axioms become derivable from Hume's Principle using Frege's techniques. See Frege [1893] , Parsons [1965] , Wright [1983] , and Heck [1993] .
5 Boolos says,
In §68 Frege first asserts that F is equinumerous with G iff the extension of 'equinumerous with F ' is the same as that of 'equinumerous with G' and then defines the number belonging to the concept F as the extension of the concept 'equinumerous with the concept F '. Since Frege, like Russell, holds that existence and uniqueness are implicit in the use of the definite article, he supposes that for any concept F , there is a unique extension of the concept 'equinumerous with F '. Thus, the sentence Numbers expresses this supposition of uniqueness in the language of Frege Arithmetic; it is the sole nonlogical assumption utilized by Frege in the course of the mathematical work done in § §68-83.
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where V is the universal concept [λx x = x]. He then defines the equivalence condition F is (logically) similar to G (F ∼ G) as follows:
where F ≡ G just means ∀x (F x ↔ Gx) . Now Boolos introduces the logical object called the subtension of F ( * F ) by adding the following Fregean biconditional principle to second-order logic:
The subtension of F is identical to the subtension of G iff F and G are (logically) similar. *
He then derives number theory by first deriving finite set theory (extensionality, separation and adjunction).
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Note that one can reformulate New V in terms of an explicit existence assertion in the same way that Boolos reformulated Hume's Principle as Numbers, using the second 'instantiation' relation η, as follows:
6 This definition is equivalent to the one Boolos uses, namely, that the universal concept can't be put in one-one correspondence with a subconcept of a small concept, as the following proof of equivalence shows:
But, it is a corollary to the Cantor-Schröder-Bernstein theorem in second order logic (see Shapiro [1991], 102-103) 
7 An object is a 'set' whenever it is the subtension of a small concept; 'x ∈ y' is defined to be true whenever ∃F (y = * F & F x); '0' is defined to be subtension of the concept [λxx = x] (i.e., 0 = * [λxx = x]); the object 'z +w' is defined as the subtension of the concept [λx x ∈ z ∨ x = w] and it is proved that if z is a set, so is z + w; the concept of 'hereditarily finite' is then defined as [λx
, as the property of having every property F which is had by 0 and which is had by z+w whenever z and w have it); it is then proved that all hereditarily finite objects and their members are (hereditarily finite) sets; and, finally, it is shown that the hereditarily finite sets validate the axioms of finite set theory.
Explicit New V:
If Explicit New V were now to replace Numbers in the language Boolos used for Frege Arithmetic, and we define:
then New V is derivable from Explicit New V.
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We may do something similar for the Basic Law V replacement proposed in Boolos [1993] . In this paper (231), Boolos builds upon an idea of Terence Parsons to develop an alternative to New V. We will call this alternative New V . Boolos defines ([1993], 231 = [1998] , 234):
where F is [λx ¬F x] . In other words, a good (i.e., non-bad) concept F is such that either F or its complement fails to be in one-to-one correspondence with the universal concept V . Boolos then essentially defines the equivalence condition 'F is (logically) similar to G' (F ∼ G):
Finally Boolos introduces a logical object that we shall call the the subtension of F by adding the following Fregean biconditional principle to second-order logic:
The subtension of F = the subtension of G iff F is (logically) similar to G. It is straightforward to reformulate New V to explicitly assert the existence of subtensions , in the same way that Explicit New V constitutes the explicit existence assertion underlying New V. The relevant axiom is:
Again, one can show that New V is derivable from Explicit New V .
The trend here is generalizable. Whenever a replacement for Basic Law V (preserving its form) is proposed, one can reformulate that replacement in terms of an explicit existence assertion using Boolos' η relation. In other words, if one has an equivalence relation R on concepts which can be used to construct an operator %F for which the biconditional %F = %G ↔ R(F, G) holds, one can show that the following explicit existence claim is equivalent to the biconditional:
It strikes us that an obvious question to ask is, why not just take these explicit existence assertions like Explicit New V and Explicit New V to the logical limit? That is, why not allow arbitrary conditions ϕ on the right-hand side of the explicit existence claim, as follows:
Boolos himself must have considered this question, for he showed that Explicit Logical Objects is inconsistent with second-order logic. He notes 9 To see this, let the principles Biconditional and Explicit be defined as follows:
Then, in second-order logic, (1) Explicit implies Biconditional under the definition
and (2) Biconditional implies Explicit under the definition
The proof is straightforward. For (1), just generalize the proof of the derivation of New V from Explicit New V. For (2), let x = %F , for any F . We need to show ∀G (Gη%F ↔ R(F, G) ). Substituting in definition of η this becomes ∀G(%G = %F ↔ R(F, G)) which is just Biconditional. To show x is unique, let y be such that ∀G(y = %G ↔ R(F, G)). Then in particular y = %F ↔ R(F, F ). Since R is an equivalence relation, R(F, F ), and so y = %F = x. that one instance of Explicit Logical Objects is the following, which essentially restates Basic Law V:
Boolos points out ([1987], 17 = [1998], 198 ) that this instance leads to a contradiction when you substitute [λz ∃H(Hηz &¬Hz)] (i.e., the property containing a concept which you don't fall under ) for F . Similarly, Boolos notes ([1987], 17 = [1998], 198-99 ) that the following
SuperRussell: ∃!x∀G(Gηx ↔ ∃y(Gy & ¬Gηy))
asserts the existence of an object that has in it all and only those properties G which fail to be contained in something which falls under G. This leads to a contradiction too.
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One might think that this is the end of the story-the comprehension schema Explicit Logical Objects is just too strong. However, as we shall see in the next section, if you place a minor restriction on comprehension for properties, one can retain Explicit Logical Objects and show that it has a wide variety of applications.
Object Theory
Suppose we were to keep Explicit Logical Objects, as stated above, but weaken the comprehension principle over concepts. Instead of full comprehension over concepts, i.e., ∃F ∀x(F x ↔ ϕ), where ϕ has no free F s, let us use a restricted comprehension principle in which ϕ is η-free:
, where ϕ has no free F s and is η-free This restriction is attractive because it preserves many of Frege's logical objects; the remainder of this paper will show how, exactly, it preserves these objects. In this section, we will show that a theory very much like this has been proposed in research conducted independently of Boolos' papers.
In [1983] , Zalta proposed an axiomatic metaphysics that formalized and systematized E. Mally's [1912] distinction between two modes of predication. Mally distinguished between an object's 'satisfying' a property and an object's being determined by a property. The formal reconstruction of Mally's distinction was used to identify 'intentional objects' (such as fictions), possible worlds, Leibnizian complete individual concepts, and other abstract objects of interest to the formal ontologist.
Of particular interest here is the elementary version of the system in [1983] , extended so as to include the theory of propositions used in the modal version of the system. We will call this subsystem Object Theory, or OT for short. OT is formulated in a second-order language that has been modified only by the inclusion of two kinds of atomic formulas: F x (read either 'x exemplifies the property F ' or 'x falls under the concept F ') and xF (read 'x encodes F ').
11 In addition, OT contains a primitive theoretical predicate E! ('being concrete') whose complement is A! ('being abstract').
12 It is axiomatic that concrete objects don't encode properties.
The proof theory of OT is just second-order logic with the restricted comprehension principle for concepts we considered above:
where ϕ has no free F s and has no encoding subformulas.
A version of Explicit Logical Objects is the system's most fundamental group of non-logical axioms:
11 We've simplified here a bit. We may assume that in OT, the exemplification mode of predication generalizes to n objects exemplifying an n-place relation. So 'F n x 1 , . . . , xn' is well formed. 12 In [1983] , Zalta reads 'E!' as 'exists', but notes (50-52) that the system could be interpreted somewhat differently. In the present paper, we will read 'E!' as 'concrete', and so there is a simple distinction between concrete and abstract objects. We reserve 'there exists' for the now standard, Quinean reading of the existential quantifier '∃'. Note that in Zalta's modal system, the 'abstract objects' are necessarily non-concrete, not simply non-concrete, and 'ordinary objects' are defined as possibly concrete. 13 In Zalta's systems, the more general comprehension principle for n-place relations, n ≥ 0, is used. Since Zalta uses a restriction on the formation of λ-expressions (namely, they may not contain encoding subformulas), both the explicit comprehension principle for relations and the derivable 1-place OT Concept Comprehension principle inherit that restriction when they are derived from λ-abstraction.
OT Object Comprehension ∃x(A!x & ∀F (xF ↔ ϕ)), where ϕ has no free xs
Finally, in OT, identity is a defined notion for concrete objects, abstract objects, and concepts.
Note that the definition of identity for objects has a consequence for OT Object Comprehension-there can't be two distinct abstract objects which encode exactly the properties satisfying ϕ. So each instance of OT Object Comprehension yields a unique abstract object encoding just the properties satisfying ϕ. Consequently, the definite description:
is always well-defined, for any formula ϕ with no free xs.
In short, OT is an extension of second-order logic that provides unrestricted object comprehension at the cost of restricting concept comprehension. Our interest in this system has two dimensions. First, OT shares deep similarities with Boolos' systems. Second, the system demonstrates that an axiom like Explicit Logical Objects can be consistently added to a suitably weakened second-order logic.
The most striking similarity between the explicit versions of Boolos' systems and OT is their use of two instantiation relations. Recall the quotation from Boolos where he notes that Frege was using two instantiation relations in the Foundations. Where Boolos uses F x and F ηx to represent these kinds of predication, OT uses F x and xF . In fact, the analogy between F ηx and xF is more than superficial. The paradoxes of η created by Explicit Logical Objects are exactly the paradoxes of encoding that would result from adding OT Object Comprehension without also restricting concept comprehension.
14 For example, compare Boolos' contradictory instance of Explicit Logical Objects:
14 The paradoxes of encoding are presented in more detail in Zalta [1983] , 158-159.
with the following paradox of encoding (Zalta [1983] , 158-159):
with 'McMichael's Paradox' of encoding (Zalta [1983] , 159):
Of course, none of these contradictions are derivable in OT when encoding subformulas are banished from property comprehension conditions. Moreover, the theory is provably consistent, as shown in Zalta [1983] (164-166) and [1999] (626-7), which are based on models of D. Scott and P. Aczel, respectively. The pattern we identified in Boolos' systems, of grounding abstraction principles for logical objects in explicit existence claims which are formulated with a second mode of predication, has its natural endpoint in OT. Working with the same, or at least similar, notions of predication, Boolos formulated theories of logical objects with unrestricted comprehension for relations but restricted comprehension conditions for logical objects, whereas Zalta independently developed a system with unrestricted comprehension for logical objects but restricted comprehension conditions for relations. In the remaining sections of this paper, we compare these two ways of developing systems for Fregean logical objects. We first develop some new results in OT concerning the range of definable logical objects, and then consider whether those results are obtainable in any of Boolos' systems.
Fregean Logical and Abstract Objects
In this section, we discuss the following kinds of logical object: natural cardinals, extensions, directions, shapes, and truth values. The material concerning the latter four kinds of logical objects are presented here as new results of OT. However, before introducing those results, we first briefly rehearse the development of number theory in Zalta [1999] .
Natural Cardinals
In Zalta [1999] , the relation of 'equinumerous with respect to ordinary objects' ('F ≈ E G') is shown to be an equivalence relation on properties.
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Then, 'the number of ordinary Gs' ('#G') is given a Frege-style definition as, follows
Then, natural cardinals are defined as:
A version of Hume's Principle is derivable from the above definitions.
Hume's Principle in OT:
Moreover, with two additional assumptions, the Dedekind/Peano axioms for number theory are then derived, mostly following Frege's plan.
16 Thus, no mathematical primitives are needed for the development of this conception of the natural numbers.
Extensions
Our new results concern extensions, directions, shapes, and truth values. First we derive a theory of extensions in OT. We begin with the definition of the equivalence condition 'F is materially equivalent to G' in the usual way:
We then define 'the extension of G' as follows:
15 In [1999] , 'ordinary' objects are defined as 'possibly concrete', i.e., as 3E!x. Now let u, v range over ordinary objects. Zalta defines:
16 See Zalta [1999] for details. The two additional assumptions are: (1) that the condition which defines Predecessor constitutes a relation, and (2) (the modal claim) that if (natural number) n numbers the G, then there might have been something distinct from all of the actual Gs. Note that the system of Zalta [1999] was developed so as to include a primitive modality, and the axioms of second-order S5 modal logic were included. This modal reformulation was essential to the proof that every number has a successor, since the proof required the interplay of the Barcan-formulas with the modal claim just described.
Our earlier discussion established that this description is well-defined. Using this definition, we can then define the notion of an extension as any object that is the extension of some concept:
Now, a consistent version of Basic Law V is derivable:
17 Basic Law V in OT:
The reason this is a consistent version of Law V is that only genuine properties (i.e., ones without encoding subformulas) are substitutable for F or G-paradoxical conditions of the kind Boolos discussed (e.g., SuperRussell) do not define genuine properties. To see that a proper notion of 'extension' has been defined here, we now show that the following principles are derivable: Extensionality, Empty Extension, Unions, Complements, Intersections, and Comprehension. First we define membership in an extension in the usual way:
The following abstraction principle for extensions immediately follows:
From this Lemma, it is easy to prove the following, where the e i are variables ranging over extensions: Suppose ∀x(x ∈ e 1 ↔ x ∈ e 2 ) and e 1 and e 2 areˇP andˇQ, respectively. Then, by the Lemma on extensions, ∀x(P x ↔ Qx), i.e. P ≡ Q. So by Basic Law V, e 1 = e 2 .
For Empty Extension:
Empty Extension: ∃!e∀x(x ∈ e)
Unions: ∀e 1 ∀e 2 ∃e 3 ∀x(x ∈ e 3 ↔ x ∈ e 1 ∨ x ∈ e 2 ) Complements: ∀e 1 ∃e 2 ∀z(z ∈ e 2 ↔ z ∈ e 1 ) Intersections:
(or the extension of any other empty concept). Then, by the Lemma on extensions, ∀x(x ∈ e). For uniqueness, suppose there exists extension e =P for some P such that ∀y(y ∈ e ). Then, by the Lemma,
For Unions:
Consider arbitrarily chosen extensions e and e . Then there are properties P and Q such that e =ˇP and e =ˇQ. Consider the property [λz P z ∨ Qz], which exists by property abstraction. Call this property H. We show that for any object x, x ∈ˇH iff x ∈ e or x ∈ e . But this follows by the λ-conversion principle and the definition of membership.
For Complements:
Consider an arbitrarily chose extension e. Then e is the extension of some concept, say P . But now consider [λy ¬P y], which exists by property comprehension. Thenˇ[λy¬P y] also exists. It is straightforward to show that something is in this extension iff it fails to be in e.
For Intersection:
Follow the same proof as for Unions, but instead using the property [λzP z&Qz]. Alternatively, use the complement of the union of the complements of e and e . 
where x is any object. By λ-conversion, it then follows that:
So by universally generalizing on x and existentially generalizing on our extension abstract, it follows that there is a extension that contains as members all and only those objects that are such that ϕ, i.e.,
∃e∀x(x ∈ e ↔ ϕ[x])

Comprehension: ∃e∀x(x ∈ e ↔ ϕ[x]),
where ϕ[x] is any formula without encoding subformulas.
Note that Pairs and Adjunction are not straightforwardly derivable-in each case, a proviso is needed. Consider the following:
The restrictions here are required because properties of the form [λy y = x] are not guaranteed to exist, given that 'x = y' is defined in terms of encoding subformulas. It should be easy to see that the property For Adjunction:
Let e be an extension and suppose E!a. Then there is some property, say P , such that e =ˇP . Now consider the property [λz P z ∨ z = E a]. Call this property H. Then it is easy to show that something y is inˇH iff y ∈ e ∨ y = E a.
From these definitions, one may define the associated notions:
Next, it is straightforward to prove the corresponding Fregean biconditionals:
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Directions in OT:
u = v ↔ u v
Shapes in OT:
One can easily see that this generalizes to any equivalence relation R on objects:
The corresponding biconditional for the logical objectx is:
It is of some interest here that although we have followed Frege in defining directions and shapes as extensions, one might argue that, strictly speaking, directions and shapes should not be reduced to extensions but rather defined as sui generis logical objects. OT can capture this idea-we may alternatively define:
This would define v, for example, as the abstract object that encodes all the properties that are implied by the property being parallel to v. It is easy to see that the corresponding Fregean biconditionals are still derivable for these alternative definitions. In proving these claims, we shall assume that the reader has some familiarity with the subtheory of propositions in Zalta [1983] , and elsewhere, which we have incorporated into OT. It is important to note that this framework is a predicate logic and not a term logic like Frege's. Sentences do not denote truth values, but receive recursively defined truth conditions. Some sentences, however, do qualify as 0-place terms (namely, the ones which have no encoding subformulas), and these do denote propositions (intensionally conceived). In particular, the theory of propositions begins with a comprehension principle for propositions. Where 'p' is a variable ranging over propositions (i.e., 0-place relations), the following is actually a 'degenerate' 0-place sub-schema of Concept Comprehension in OT:
∃p(p ↔ ϕ), where ϕ has no free ps and no encoding subformulas In addition, there is a definition of proposition identity:
In this definition, the identity of p and q is defined in terms of the identity 
This says that the extension of p is the abstract object that encodes all and only the properties of the form [λy q] which are constructed out of propositions q materially equivalent to p. To get a more natural sense of what this definition does, let us extend our notion of encoding so that objects can encode propositions:
Using this extended notion of encoding, we may read our definition of p • more simply as follows: the truth value of p is the abstract object that encodes exactly the propositions materially equivalent to p.
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It is now straightforward to define the notion of a truth value as any object that is the truth value of some proposition:
The Fregean biconditional governing truth values is a consequence of our work so far:
The resulting theory of propositions is consistent with the claim that there are distinct propositions which are nevertheless materially equivalent. That is, one may consistently assert the existence of propositions p, q such that both p = q and p ↔ q. In modal developments of object theory, the definition of proposition identity becomes consistent with the claim that there are distinct propositions which are necessarily equivalent. 24 It is for this reason that we do not define p • asˇ[λy p]. This latter definition would make the truth value of a proposition an extension containing objects, whereas on our present definition, the truth of a proposition more like an extension 'containing' (encoding) propositions. 25 Here is the proof:
Truth Values in OT:
Now the two truth values The True ( ) and The False (⊥) are identifiable:
We may prove that these two objects are indeed truth values:
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Theorem: T-value( ) & T-value(⊥)
Finally, we may establish the fundamental theorem governing truth values, namely, that there are exactly two of them:
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It is a simple lemma to establish that q • encodes p iff p ≡ q (exercise). Now pick arbitrary propositions p 1 and q 1 . (→) Assume p • 1 is identical to q • 1 . Given the simple lemma and the self-equivalence of p 1 , it is easy to show that p • 1 encodes p 1 . So q • 1 encodes p 1 . So, again, by our simple lemma, it follows that p 1 is materially equivalent to q 1 . (←) Assume p 1 is materially equivalent to q 1 . To show that p • 1 is identical to q • 1 , we show they encode the same properties. (→) Assume p • 1 encodes P . Then there is a proposition, say r 1 , such that r 1 is materially equivalent to p 1 and such that P is identical to being such that r 1 . So there is a proposition r (namely r 1 ) such that r is materially equivalent to q 1 and such that P is identical to [λy r]. So, by the definition of q • 1 , it follows that q • 1 encodes P . (←) By analogous reasoning.
26 Here is the proof that is a truth value:
We want to show that is identical with the truth value of some proposition. So pick any arbitrary proposition you please, say p 1 , and consider the proposition p 1 → p 1 . Call this proposition p 2 . Since p 2 is a logical truth, it is true. Now to show that is identical with p • 2 , we need to show that encodes a property
Then there is a proposition, say r 1 , such that r 1 is true and Q is the property being such that r 1 . Since p 2 and r 1 are both true, they are materially equivalent. So there is a proposition r (namely, r 1 ) such that r is materially equivalent to p 2 and such that Q is the property being such that r . So, by the definition of p • 2 , it follows that p • 2 encodes Q. (←). Assume that p • 2 encodes Q. So, there is a proposition, say r 1 , such that r 1 is materially equivalent to p 2 and such that Q is being identical with r 1 . But since p 2 is true, r 1 is true. So there is a proposition r (namely, r 1 ) which is true and such that Q is being such that r . So encodes Q.
The proof that ⊥ is a truth value is left as an exercise. 27 Here is the proof:
Since by our previous theorems we know that and ⊥ are both truth values, it suffices to show that they are distinct and that any other truth value is identical to either or ⊥. Since it is obvious that they are distinct, we simply prove
Logical Objects in Boolos' Systems
In his work in [1986] , [1989], and [1993] , Boolos has shown some of the strengths of New V and New V as a ground for set theory. This work has been refined by Shapiro and Weir [1999] , where they consider which standard axioms of set theory are derivable from New V and which are not. In this section, we ask to what extent the systems of (Explicit) New V and New V can be used to identify other kinds of logical objects.
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More precisely, we will examine whether Boolos' systems can yield biconditionals like Hume's Principle, Directions, and Shapes when the relevant objects are defined as Frege suggested. We will see that New V and New V often identify as 'large' or 'bad' the concepts that Frege used to define logical objects. Shapiro and Weir ([1999] , 301) offer the following counterexample to Hume's Principle in New V. They note that the property, A, of being a singleton concept and the property, B, of being a doubleton concept are both large, and so they are logically similar and therefore have the same extension. Thus, where 1 is the extension of A, and 2 is the extension of B, it would follow that 1 = 2. This quick counterexample does demonstrate a problem that faces New V for the reconstruction of Fregean number theory. But a more in-depth analysis will offer an insight into the obstacles that lie in the way of reconstructing numbers and other logical objects using either New V or New V . On our analysis, Hume's Principle fails in these systems because the that every truth value is identical to either or ⊥. So assume that z is a truth value. So there is some proposition, say p 1 , such that z = p • 1 . Now it is easy to show that, in general, p → (p • = ) and ¬p → (p • = ⊥). So, given that either p 1 or ¬p 1 , it follows by disjunctive syllogism, that either p • 1 = or p • 1 =⊥. So either z = or z =⊥. 28 We do not consider whether Numbers could serve as a basis for a theory of logical objects because, unlike New V and New V , it is intended only to make the existence assertion implicit in Hume's Principle explicit. Numbers was never intended to provide a foundation for logical objects generally. concept used to define cardinal numbers is 'large' and 'bad'. Remember that Frege defined the finite cardinal 'the number of F s' as the extension of the higher-order concept being equinumerous with F . Since Boolos' system does not contain λ-expressions for higher-order concepts, this Fregean definition for the finite cardinal can't be reconstructed. However, Frege suggested a suitable substitute in [1893] , §34. Let us define 'the number of F 's' as the subtension of the concept being a subtension of a concept equinumerous to F (Q F ):
Hume's Principle, New V, and New V
We may therefore define:
Now it is a fundamental fact about the system of New V and New V that the following holds:
where F is the complement of F . In words, if F is a small, nonempty concept with a large complement then the concept being the subtension of a concept equinumerous with F is large and bad. example, Boolos has shown [1989] that New V is sufficient for the development of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory without the powerset and infinity axioms. Here, we have only tried to explain why Frege's own development of arithmetic is not available in New V and New V .
Directions and Shapes
In both New V and New V , the provability of the biconditionals Directions and Shapes depends upon the assumptions one makes about directions and shapes. In Boolos's systems, a would be identified as F denotes some natural number that encodes this set. If F denotes an infinite set, then * F denotes 0. Now interpret such that x y iff x and y are either both even or both odd. Then [λz z 2] and [λz z 3] are both large so they have the same subtension, however, ¬(2 3)-contra Directions.
Truth Values
In Boolos [1986] (148), Boolos considers adding propositional variables along with a special axiom p
However, if propositional variables are added to the New V system and degenerate 0-place instances of concept comprehension are allowed, this biconditional can be proven using the following definition of truth value:
This definition maps all true propositions to the universal concept and all false propositions to the empty concept. From this definition the biconditional 
Observations
We saw earlier that the nonlogical axioms in Boolos' systems can be grounded in the existence assertions Explicit New V and Explicit New V . These axioms involve a second mode of predication and provide a basis of comparison with OT's comprehension for abstract objects. In particular, whereas Boolos has unrestricted property comprehension and restricted object comprehension, OT restricts property comprehension and leaves object comprehension unrestricted. We asked to what extent each approach was capable of developing Fregean logical objects such as extensions, natural cardinals, directions, shapes, and truth values. A lot of work has been done to reveal the strengths of Boolos' systems as a basis for a 'limitation of size' set theory. It is from set theory 31 For the proof in New V: that Boolos can develop arithmetic and other mathematical constructs. However, because New V and New V conflate the extensions of 'bad' concepts these systems prove unsuitable for defining Fregean natural cardinals. The story for other logical objects is similar. For directions and shapes, additional geometric axioms are necessary to forestall a countermodel to Directions and Shapes. A simulation of truth values is possible, although truth values look more like extensions of one-place concepts than the extensions of zero-place propositions.
Contrast these results with the theory of logical objects in OT. We saw that natural cardinals have a Fregean definition in a modal extension of OT and a version of Hume's Principle is derivable under this definition. However, there are two caveats. The first is that equinumerosity on concepts must be restricted to ordinary objects, and so the resulting cardinals count only the ordinary objects falling under a concept, though Hume's Principle is derivable and governs this notion of natural cardinal. Second, the derivation of number theory requires two additional assumptions (see Zalta [1999] ).
A second group of paradigm logical objects, extensions, is definable and is governed by a provably consistent version of Basic Law V. In addition some basic set-theoretic principles are shown to hold for extensions. Because shapes and directions are definable in terms of extensions, their associated biconditionals are provable. Indeed, for any equivalence relation on objects, one can define logical objects that correspond to the cells of the partition and prove the corresponding Fregean biconditional. Finally, we identified truth values as distinctive logical objects in their own right. They satisfy the corresponding Fregean biconditional and provably have the other properties typically associated with truth values.
The inconsistency of Basic Law V with second-order logic shows that extensions cannot be well-behaved for all concepts (i.e., well-behaved in the sense that only extensions of materially equivalent concepts are equal). Most attempts at saving Frege's work have made extensions well-behaved in a smaller class of concepts.
33 By comparing extensions in OT with subtensions in Boolos, it is clear that in OT, extensions are well-behaved for the concepts that are definable without encoding subformulas, while in Boolos's systems, subtensions are well-behaved for concepts that are small or good. A suitable reconstruction of Frege's work, we argue, must provide a basis for defining logical objects like the one offered here. Further research should be done comparing other reconstructions of Fregean logical objects, as well as comparing the modal versions of these neo-Fregean systems.
Appendix
Here we show the fact about New V and New V mentioned in the text; namely that
holds in both New V and New V . To show Q F is large it suffices to verify that g both (1) has range in Q F and (2) (B) Two cases. In the first case, suppose F has more than one member. Define a map g : V → Q F by g(x) = * [λz z = x]. To show Q F is large it suffices to verify that g both (1) has range in Q F and (2) is injective. For (1), since objects in the range of g are subtensions of singleton concepts, and F is not a singleton, it follows that the range of g is in Q F . For (2) it suffices to show that if x = x then * [λz z = x] = * [λz z = x ], but this follows from New V.
Proof
In the second case, suppose F has exactly one member, a. Then we can define a similar map g :
show Q F is large it suffices to verify that g both (1) has range in Q F and (2) is injective. For (1), since objects in the range of g are subtensions of doubleton concepts, and F is a singleton, it follows that the range of
